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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Was the trial court correct in ruling that defendant 
Burns International Security Services ("Burns") was entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law and that there were no issues 
of material fact which would preclude summary judgment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court of Appeals in its review of a 
trial court's grant of summary judgment as a matter of law gives no 
deference to the trial court's view of the lawf but reviews it for 
correctness. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 188 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 32 
(Ct. App. May 28, 1992). 
A mere dispute to some question of fact does not preclude the 
granting of summary judgment. The disputed factual issue must be 
one which is material in the sense that resolving it is necessary 
to determine the parties' legal rights. F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. 
Build, Inc.. 12 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, 673 (1965). 
DETERMINATIVE RULE 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the 
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing 
may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall 
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may 
be rendered on the issue of liability alone although 
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
On July 26, 1988, defendant, Gloria Swenson, a security guard 
for Burns at the Geneva Steel Plant in Utah County, Utah, drove her 
automobile to the Frontier Cafe located approximately at 1600 
South, Lindon (1600 North, Orem), and purchased a cup of soup for 
her lunch. On the return trip from the cafe, Ms. Swenson was 
involved in an accident with a motorcycle ridden by plaintiffs Jeff 
Christensen and Kyle James Fausett. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit 
naming both Ms. Swenson and Burns as defendants, alleging that 
Swenson was acting within the course and scope of her employment 
for Burns at the time of the accident. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On July 17, 1991, Burns filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
based on the argument that defendant Swenson was not within the 
course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident. 
(R. 106.) 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
Following submission of memoranda by the parties, and oral 
argument to the trial court on November 1, 1991 (R. 204), the 
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen issued a Ruling granting Defendant 
Burns' Motion for Summary Judgment dated November 5, 1991. (R. 
206.) A Summary Judgment and Rule 54(b) Certification of Final 
Order was signed by Judge Christensen and filed in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court Clerk's Office on November 21, 1991. (R. 
214.) It was from this Summary Judgment that plaintiffs appealed. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The following relevant facts are presented as a means of 
adding to the Statement of Facts set forth in Appellants' Brief. 
It should be noted that many of the references to the record in 
Appellants' Brief merely refer to general page numbers of 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum "Statement of Facts," without specifically 
citing to the original source of the facts. To avoid confusion, 
all references in Appellee's Brief will be to the specific source 
in the record, including specific references to depositions which 
have been published in this action. 
1. On July 26, 1989, defendant Gloria Swenson was assigned as 
a security guard for Burns at Gate 4 of the Geneva Steel Plant in 
Utah County, State of Utah, and to no other assignments.1 
2. The Geneva Plant boundaries were contained within a fenced 
area, bounded on the east by fence and railroad tracks located on 
the west side of Geneva Road.2 
3. At the time of the accident, Ms. Swenson, as a security 
guard at Gate 4, had responsibilities to work between the island 
station and Gate 4, which were within the spatial boundaries of the 
Geneva Steel Plant.3 
1
 Deposition of Gloria Swenson, p. 11, lines 4-7; p. 12, lines 
2-25. A copy of relevant portions from Gloria Swenson's deposition 
cited herein is attached hereto as Addendum 1. 
2
 Gloria Swenson Deposition, p. 19, lines 7-14; p. 20, lines 
1-15. 
3
 Gloria Swenson Deposition, p. 22, lines 1-11. 
3 
4. Shortly after 11:00 a.m. on July 26, 1988, Gloria Swenson 
called by telephone to the Frontier Cafe located at approximately 
1600 South, Lindon (1600 North, Orem), east of Geneva Road, outside 
the spatial boundaries of the Geneva Steel Plant, and ordered a cup 
of soup for lunch.4 
5. The security guards were allowed to take short breaks in 
the area of their appointed posts. Lunch was expected to be taken 
on the job.5 
6. Ms. Swenson drove her personal car across the highway to 
go to the Frontier Cafe in order to pick up her lunch.6 
7. Ms. Swenson did not buy or pick up any lunch for any other 
person or guard of Burns.7 
8. Ms. Swenson admitted that she made a personal choice to go 
outside the spatial boundaries of the Geneva Plant to the Frontier 
Cafe to obtain the soup for her lunch and that she was not directed 
by anyone at Burns to go to the Frontier Cafe.8 
9. After picking up her cup of soup at the Frontier Cafe, Ms. 
Swenson was involved in a collision between her motor vehicle and 
4
 Deposition of Gloria Swenson, p. 17, lines 16-25; p. 24, 
lines 23-25. 
5
 Deposition of Mike Transtrum, p. 68, lines 5-6. Relevant 
portions of the deposition of Mike Transtrum are attached hereto as 
Addendum 2. 
6
 Deposition of Gloria Swenson, p. 25, lines 1-7. 
7
 Deposition of Gloria Swenson, p. 25, lines 11-17. 
8
 Deposition of Gloria Swenson, p. 23, line 24 through p. 24, 
line 4; also p. 72, lines 9 through p. 73, line 1. 
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the motorcycle upon which plaintiffs were riding on Geneva Road. 
(R. 11.) 
10. After hearing oral argument, and reviewing the file and 
the memoranda submitted by counsel, Judge Cullen Christensen 
entered the following written ruling granting Summary Judgment in 
this matter: 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-
501, on the motion of Def[endant] Burns International 
Security Services seeking Summary Judgment. The Court 
has reviewed the filef considered the memoranda of 
counsel, entertained argument of counsel, and upon being 
advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
1. Said motion is granted for the following reasons: 
(a) In the view of the Court there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that said Def[endant] 
is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law. 
(b) That in going to the Frontier Cafe to buy 
lunch, Gloria Swenson's conduct was not as a 
matter of law of the general kind for which 
she was employed to perform by Def [endant] 
Burns. 
(c) That the conduct of Swenson in going to the 
Frontier Cafe was not as a matter of law 
within the ordinary spatial boundaries of her 
employment with Burns. 
(d) That the conduct of Swenson in going to the 
Frontier Cafe was not as a matter of law 
motivated in whole or in part by the purpose 
of serving Burns' interest as the employer of 
Swenson. 
(e) That in the opinion of the Court the activity 
of Swenson in leaving her post at Gate 4 to go 
to the Frontier Cafe to purchase lunch was so 
clearly without the scope of her employment 
with Burns that reasonable minds could not 
differ as to such conclusion. 
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The following facts are presented to clarify those statements 
set forth in Appellants' Statement of Facts which are mischaracter-
ized, misleading or immaterial to the issues presented by the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
11. Plaintiffs stated that the district manager testified 
that he had picked up and distributed lunch to his employees by 
referring to the Trial Record at 142. (Appellants' Brief at 4.) 
Paragraph 17 (R. 142) states that historically (before Geneva was 
reopened under new management after closure by USX) when Mr. Mayne 
worked directly for USX as a roving patrolman, part of his job was 
to pick up and distribute lunches throughout the mill to USX 
employees. That is no longer the practice and is irrelevant.9 
12. Gloria Swenson stated that she brought back food to her 
lieutenant at times (see Appellants' Brief at 4); however, she 
testified she would only do that while on graveyard shift when 
things were slowed. She never testified that she was instructed to 
or brought back food for her lieutenant at any time during the day 
shift, which is the shift she was working at the time of the 
accident.10 
13. Plaintiffs stated that Ms. Swenson testified that her 
lieutenant told her to check with other employees before she went 
to pick up her lunch. (See Appellants' Brief at 4.) The reference 
9
 Deposition of Kenneth H. Mayne, p. 41, line 5 through p. 42, 
line 7. Relevant portions of the deposition of Kenneth Mayne are 
attached hereto as Addendum 3. 
10
 Deposition of Gloria Swenson, p. 56, line 19 through p. 57, 
line 5. 
6 
to Trial Record page 139 in turn refers to pages 57 and 58 of Ms. 
Swenson's Deposition. Ms. Swenson's testimony regarding picking up 
lunches for single staffed posts refers to her post-accident 
assignment as a rover in Car 7 and Car 8, during the graveyard 
shift. Again, these were not the job duties or areas of 
responsibility at the time of the accident when Ms. Swenson was 
assigned strictly to daytime guard duty at Gate 4.11 Any reference 
to duties of rovers during graveyard shift is immaterial to the 
issue at hand. 
14. Oreon Olson, the guard on duty with Ms. Swenson at Gate 
4 at the time of the accident, testified that during his day shift 
at Gate 4, he could not recall any guard calling to request another 
guard to pick up lunch for them at the Frontier Cafe.12 
15. On occasion, company officials from Salt Lake City held 
meetings at the Frontier Cafe with lieutenants, but Gloria Swenson 
and the other security guards were never invited to or attended any 
meetings or training by the company at the Frontier Cafe. (See 
Appellants' Brief at 4.) Any references to such meetings are 
immaterial to the issue of course and scope of the employment of 
Ms. Swenson at the time of the accident.13 
11
 Deposition of Gloria Swenson, p. 57, line 4 through p. 58, 
line 5. 
12
 Deposition of Oreon G. Olson, p. 27, line 20 through p. 28, 
line 4. Relevant portions of the Deposition of Oreon Olson are 
attached hereto as Addendum 4. 
13
 Deposition of Gloria Swenson, p. 43, line 9 through p. 44, 
line 6. 
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16. If lieutenants occasionally picked up food in their own 
cars at the Frontier Cafe, they did not do so for any of the Burns 
employees acting as security guards, but perhaps for meetings of 
lieutenants and captains.14 
17. Whenever a security guard decided to pick up lunch at the 
Frontier Cafe, that security guard considered that trip to be a 
personal errand, and it was not an assigned duty of his or her 
job.15 
18. Plaintiffs have argued that Mr. Transtrum observed Burns 
guards using the cafe for various breaks including latrine and 
lunch breaks. However, Mr. Transtrum stated that he was aware that 
this happened at times, but was limited to the "rover" in the 
automobile, not a Gate 4 or Gate 1 guard. At the time of the 
accident, Gloria Swenson was not a rover, but was later assigned to 
that duty. Therefore, any references to lunch or latrine breaks by 
rovers is immaterial to the issue at hand.16 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Burns submitted sufficient material facts in connection with 
its original Memorandum and Reply Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment to allow the Court to review the facts 
and determine that there was no genuine issues of material fact. 
14
 Deposition of Gloria Swenson, p. 56, lines 11-18. 
15
 Deposition of Eugene S. Bezzant, p. 23, line 25 through p. 
24, line 5. Relevant portions of the deposition of Eugene S. 
Bezzant are attached hereto as Addendum 5. 
16
 Deposition of Mike Transtrum at p. 42, line 6 through p. 43, 
line 21. 
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Despite plaintiffs' arguments of insufficient facts submitted by 
defendant Burns, the Court had ample opportunity to view the facts 
which potentially might be considered to create a genuine material 
fact. Even with plaintiffs' efforts to create an issue through 26 
pages of factual summaries and presentation of "facts,M plaintiffs 
have failed to create an issue of material fact upon which 
reasonable minds could differ that would preclude summary judgment 
in favor of defendant. 
A mere dispute as to a fact does not preclude the granting of 
summary judgment unless the issue is a material fact. An issue 
that creates a dispute precluding summary judgment must be one 
whose resolution is necessary to determine the legal rights of the 
parties. F.M.A. Financial Corp., 404 P.2d at 673. Facts presented 
by plaintiffs relating to acts by management of Burns, including 
lieutenants, or job assignments different than Ms. Swenson's at the 
time of the accident, or subsequent job assignments of Ms. Swenson, 
are immaterial and cannot be considered to create a material 
dispute of fact that would justify overturning summary judgment in 
this matter. 
Judge Christensen recognized the established tests for 
determining the issue of course and scope of an employee. The 
Court found, based on material facts, that Ms. Swenson's personal 
trip to the Frontier Cafe was not the general kind for which she 
had been employed to perform for Burns. Ms. Swenson was wholly 
involved in a personal endeavor at the time of the accident. 
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Clearly, the excursion of Ms. Swenson, to obtain lunch for 
herself at the time of the accident, took her substantially outside 
the ordinary spatial boundaries of her employment at Gate 4 within 
the Geneva Plant. 
Finally, the "dual purpose" doctrine explained by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 
1991) demonstrates that the primary motivation for Ms. Swenson's 
trip to the Frontier Cafe was personal, and that any benefit to 
Burns as her employer was purely incidental. The company would not 
have been forced to send another employee over the same route to 
perform the same function if she had decided not to get lunch for 
herself. For those reasons the Court was justified in granting 
summary judgment to Burns. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT BURNS IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. There are no genuine issues of material fact. 
Despite plaintiffs' best efforts to recharacterize the 
evidence and create issues of fact which are immaterial, plaintiffs 
have failed to create an issue of material fact that precludes 
summary judgment. Well established Utah law requires that an issue 
in dispute "must be one which is material in the sense that 
resolving it is necessary to determine the legal rights of the 
parties." F.M.A. Financial Corp., 404 P.2d at 673. Any disputed 
issues that might exist in the record are issues that are 
unnecessary to determine the legal rights of the parties. In other 
words, they are unrelated to the core issues required by the Utah 
10 
Supreme Court to establish liability of an employer under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior. 
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and testimony 
demonstrate there to be no genuine issue of any material fact and 
that the moving party is also entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. This rule does not preclude summary judgment simply because 
some fact is still in dispute, "but only when a material fact is 
genuinely controverted." Healar Ranch Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 
1390, 1391 (Utah 1980) (citing Kesler v. Kesler, 583 P.2d 87 (Utah 
1978)). 
Even under the standard of review required of this Court to 
view the facts and inferences drawn from those facts in the light 
most favorable to the losing party, this Court must draw reasonable 
and logical inferences from those facts. An appellate court cannot 
merely adopt plaintiff's arguments for inferences or assertions of 
materiality for clearly immaterial facts in order to create an 
argument for preclusion of summary judgment. Inferences must be 
logical and consistent with the material facts applied by the trial 
judge in granting summary judgment. 
Defendant will demonstrate that the facts established by the 
record ably support its argument that the conduct of Gloria Swenson 
fell outside the scope of her employment at the time of the 
accident. 
B. Gloria Swenson's conduct fell outside the 
scope of her employment. 
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Before Utah Courts may determine liability of an employer for 
the accident of an employee, that employee's conduct must be shown 
to have complied with the following three criteria: 
"First, an employees conduct must be of the general kind 
the employee is employed to perform. . . • In other 
words, the employee must be about the employer's business 
and the duties assigned by the employer, as opposed to 
being wholly involved in a personal endeavor." Second, 
the employee's conduct must occur substantially within 
the hours and ordinary spatial boundaries of the 
employment. "Third, the employee's conduct must be 
motivated at least in part, by the purpose of serving the 
employer's interest." 
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1991) 
(quoting Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 
1989) (footnotes omitted). 
The Supreme Court has also recognized that under specific fact 
situations, "such as when the employee's conduct serves a dual 
purpose, or when the employee takes a personal detour in the course 
of carrying out his employer's directions," the Court has used 
variations of the above three-pronged test. .Id. The Court has 
indicated that these variations are not to be considered departures 
from the Birkner criteria. "Rather, they are methods of applying 
the criteria in specific factual situations." Id. at 1041. 
Wisely, the Court realized that not all facts can be neatly 
compartmentalized. The following brief discussion will demonstrate 
the trial court's correctness in applying the Birkner test, as 
refined by the Clover decision, to the facts of this case. 
1. Gloria Swenson was wholly involved 
in a personal endeavor. 
12 
The first requirement of the Birkner test is that employee's 
conduct is "of the general kind the employee is employed to 
perform." 771 P.2d at 1056-57. The Supreme Court supplied 
additional direction in interpreting this requirement by stating: 
In other words, the employee must be about the employer's 
business and the duties assigned by the employer as 
opposed to being wholly involved in a personal endeavor. 
Id. at 1057 (emphasis added). The deposition testimony of both 
Gloria Swenson and the of the other Gate 4 guards, demonstrates 
that lunch guards' trips to the Frontier Cafe were not daily 
occurrences, but only an occasional practice. For instance, Mr. 
Eugene Bezzant testified that on average he would go to the 
Frontier Cafe once a month. See Addendum 5, p. 19, lines 16-21. 
He also was of the opinion that he was involved in a personal 
errand when he was getting himself lunch, rather than performing 
some duty assigned or required by the company. Id., p. 19, line 22 
through p. 20, line 12. 
Even Gloria Swenson admitted that she had the personal choice 
to either bring a lunch or to pick something up to eat from the 
Frontier Cafe, off premises. See Addendum 1, p. 24, lines 6-7, 16-
18. She was never instructed by anyone at Burns to get lunch at 
the Frontier Cafe rather than bringing her own lunch to work. Id.. 
p. 23, lines 3-15. Also, Ms. Swenson admitted that she was not 
picking up food for anyone other than for herself on the day of the 
accident. Id., p. 72, lines 9-23. Oreon Olson, the Burns Security 
guard who was working at Gate 4 with Ms. Swenson on the day of the 
accident, stated that he would consider a Burns guard to be on his 
13 
own time if she went to the Frontier Cafe to pick up lunch for 
herself. See Addendum 4, p. 35, lines 1-8. 
By quoting the following excerpt from Comment (c) of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229, at page 15 of their Brief, 
plaintiffs unwittingly establish the appropriateness of the summary 
judgment granted by the trial court in support of their argument 
that a lunch may be part of the work that is considered employment 
duties of the employee: 
If, however, such acts [such personal matters as eating 
and cleaning of the person] are for the personal 
convenience of the employees and are merely permitted by 
the master in order to make the employment more 
des irable, the acts are not within the scope of 
employment. 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229, Comment (c) (1958) (emphasis 
added). The established facts, even when viewed in the light most 
favorable to plaintiff, demonstrate that the lunch break taken by 
plaintiff, was a mater of personal convenience to Ms. Swenson. 
To understand what factors are deemed important under this 
first criterion of Birkner, a review of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Clover v. Snowbird Resort would be beneficial. The 
Supreme Court, in Clover, reversed an order of summary judgment 
in favor of defendant after careful analysis of the Birkner 
criteria for respondeat superior claims. In Clover, Chris 
Zulliger, was employed by Snowbird as a chef at the Plaza 
Restaurant and was supervised by his father, Hans Zulliger, who was 
head chef of the Plaza Restaurant located at the base of the resort 
and the Mid-Gad Restaurant located halfway to the top of the 
mountain. Id. at 1038. Chris was instructed as part of his job to 
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monitor the operation of the Mid-Gad Restaurant on an ongoing basis 
and was specifically directed to inspect the Mid-Gad Restaurant on 
the day of the accident before returning to work later in the day 
at the Plaza Restaurant. Id. at 1038-39. Chris went skiing during 
that day and in the middle of his first run stopped at Mid-Gad and 
performed his inspection. Thereafter, he skied four additional 
runs before skiing down the mountain to begin his work at the Plaza 
Restaurant. During his final run on a route often taken by 
Snowbird employees traveling from the top of the mountain to the 
Plaza, Chris struck Ms. Clover seriously injuring her. Id. 
In applying the first criterion of the Birkner test to the 
facts in Clover. the Supreme Court found it important that one of 
Chris Zulliger's assignments was to monitor the operations of the 
Mid-Gad, and that he was specifically directed to inspect those 
operations on the very day of the accident. Id. at 1041. The 
Court also noted that the employer, Snowbird, intended that 
Zulliger use ski lifts and ski runs while travelling to Mid-Gad. 
Therefore, the Court concluded "that Zulliger's actions could be 
considered to 'be of the general kind that the employee is employed 
to perform.'" Id. (quoting Birkner, 771 P.2d at 1057). 
The facts of this case demonstrate that Ms. Swenson's conduct 
did not meet the first criterion. There was no directive by Burns 
to Swenson to travel off the premises to the Frontier Cafe. There 
were no duties of Swenson to perform at the Frontier Cafe, and 
there was no errand to perform on behalf of Burns of any of its 
employees. It is clear that Ms. Swenson chose to obtain her lunch 
15 
off the work premises for a wholly personal reasons. Burns 
employees were encouraged to bring their own lunch, and even though 
Burns guards at Gate 4 occasionally chose to travel to the Frontier 
Cafe to obtain lunch, this cannot be considered to fall within the 
general conduct the employee was employed to perform. These trips 
were merely done for the guard's own personal convenience. 
Therefore, given the Clover analysis, plaintiffs have failed to 
demonstrate that reasonable minds could find that the conduct of 
Ms. Swenson fit within the first criterion of the Birkner test. 
Because of such failure, Gloria Swenson cannot be considered to 
have been within the course and scope of her employment at the time 
of the accident. On this basis alone, summary judgment was 
properly granted. 
2. Gloria Swenson's trip to the Frontier Cafe 
and the accident occurred substantially 
outside the ordinary spatial boundaries 
of her employment as a security guard at 
Gate 4 on the Geneva Property. 
The second criterion of the Birkner test, as refined by 
Clover, requires an employee to be substantially within both the 
hours and the normal spatial boundaries of her employment at the 
time any action arises. See Clover, 808 P.2d at 1040. Again, 
under this criterion, an analysis of the facts illustrates 
plaintiffs' failure in the case at hand to demonstrate that an 
issue exists which would preclude summary judgment. 
Under Clover, Chief Justice Hall, writing for the unanimous 
Court, pointed out that young Zulliger was expected to monitor the 
Mid-Gad Restaurant operations during the time the lifts were 
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operating while he was not working a shift at the Plaza. The Court 
recognized, as a key element, the fact that "throughout the trip he 
would have been on his employer's premises." Id. at 1041. 
In contrast to Clover, plaintiffs in this appeal "acknowledge 
that the cafe does not lie within the geographical boundaries of 
the Geneva plant . . . ." (Appellants' Brief at 8.) However, in 
their attempt to qualify Ms. Swenson's conduct under the second 
criterion of the Birkner test, plaintiffs appear to restrict the 
analysis of the Clover case, ironically, in order to convince this 
Court that it must broaden its analysis of the spatial boundaries 
of the Geneva plant. Plaintiffs mistakenly argue that the Supreme 
Court ignored the fact that Mr. Zulliger's spatial boundaries of 
his employment restricted him to the Plaza Restaurant. This 
ignores the facts of Clover and the Court's analysis that Zulliger 
had specific responsibilities as well as general responsibilities 
at both the Plaza and the Mid-Gad Restaurants, which required him 
to work at and between those restaurants. That included riding the 
ski lifts as well as skiing the slopes as part of his normal job 
responsibilities, all of which were included within the normal 
spatial boundaries of his employment, namely the entire Snowbird 
Ski Resort. Id. 
It would be disingenuous for plaintiffs to argue that the 
normal spatial boundaries of the employment of Ms. Swenson were 
beyond the physical boundaries of the Geneva plant, while she 
performed her duties as a security guard at Gate 4 at the time of 
the accident. Any facts which do not relate to Ms. Swenson's 
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assignments while at Gate 4, or which involve acts by other 
employees# assigned to other jobs such as roving guards, 
lieutenants or company management employees are clearly immaterial 
and cannot be deemed to create any issue of material fact. 
In failing to provide any evidence beyond the obvious 
limitations of spatial boundaries, plaintiffs have also failed to 
demonstrate that reasonable minds could differ as to the 
application of the second criterion of the Birkner test to Gloria 
Swenson. This failure further supports an independent basis for 
summary judgment in favor of defendant Burns. 
3. The primary motivation for Swenson's trip to 
the Cafe was personal, and, therefore, outside 
the scope of her employment. 
The Clover decision also serves as a useful framework for 
analysis of the third criterion of the Birkner test which requires 
the employee's conduct to "be motivated at least in part, by the 
purpose of serving the employer's interest." Clover, 808 P.2d at 
1040 (quoting Birkner, 771 P.2d at 1057). In Clover, the Court 
recognized that specific fact situations may require occasional use 
of a variation, which is not a departure from the criteria 
formulated by Birkner, but is, rather, a method of applying a more 
flexible approach to certain factual situations. Id. at 1040-41. 
The first variation forwarded by the Supreme Court in Clover 
is to be utilized where "the employee's conduct serves a dual 
purpose." Id. at 1041. The Court recognized that difficulties 
were created from the fact that Zulliger did not immediately return 
to the Plaza after completing his inspection of the Mid-Gad 
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facility, but skied four more runs and rode the lift to the top of 
the mountain before his return to the Plaza Restaurant. It was 
argued by Snowbird that these actions demonstrated that Zulliger's 
primary purpose for skiing was for his own pleasure, and therefore 
he could not be considered to be acting within the scope of his 
employment, id. The Court recognized that its previous decision 
in Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance, 801 P.2d 934 (Utah 
1989) held that "if the primary motivation for an activity is 
personal, even though there may be some transaction of business or 
performance of duty merely incidental or adjunctive thereto, the 
[person] should not be deemed to be in the scope of his 
employment." Clover, 808 P.2d at 1041 (quoting Whitehead, 801 P.2d 
at 937) (bracketed language in original). 
Recognizing the dual purpose doctrine as explained in 
Whitehead, the Court in Clover suggested a useful test that could 
be utilized to determine if a transaction that might arguably have 
a business purpose, actually appeared incidental to the 
overwhelming personal motive. In that test, a trip will not be 
deemed to be personal if it "is one which would have required the 
employer to send another employee over the same route or to perform 
the same function if the trip had not been made." Id. (quoting 
Whitehead. 801 P.2d at 937). 
The Supreme Court distinguished the Clover case from the 
Whitehead case in that in Whitehead, an employee who was involved 
in an accident during his commute home was held to be outside the 
scope of his employment, even though he planned to make business 
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calls from his home, thereby creating a dual purpose question. 
However, the Court in Whitehead indicated that those business calls 
could have been made as easily from any place as from his home. 
The Court in Clover distinguished Whitehead from the Clover facts 
by finding that the activity of inspecting the Mid-Gad Restaurant 
necessitated travel to the restaurant. They then provided the key 
to the analysis under this test with the following: 
If Zulliger had not inspected the restaurant, it would 
have been necessary to send a second employee to 
accomplish the same purpose. Furthermore, the second 
employee would have most likely used the ski lifts and 
ski runs in travelling to and from the restaurant. 
Clover, 1808 P.2d at 1041. 
Clearly, under the facts of this appeal, Burns would not have 
been required to send a second employee to accomplish the purpose 
of Gloria Swenson in going to the Frontier Cafe. She decided to go 
there for purely personal reasons, namely to obtain her lunch. She 
was not directed by anyone at Burns to leave her post to obtain 
lunch, and she did not obtain lunch for any other employee. Even 
if this Court is to accept plaintiffs' averment that Ms. Swenson 
was motivated out of a sense of serving her employer's interest by 
obtaining lunch as quickly as possible, the predominant purpose of 
the trip was personal, and merely incidentally related to business. 
Hence, under application of this dual purpose approach suggested in 
Clover and Whitehead, plaintiffs fail to establish that Swenson was 
within the course of her employment at the time of the accident. 
Plaintiffs have also erroneously argued for application of the 
"personal detour" approach under the dual purpose doctrine, as set 
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forth in Clover, The Court applied that approach because they 
found there was "ample evidence that there was a predominant 
business purpose for Zulliger's trip to Mid-Gad." Id. at 1042. 
That is not the case in this appeal before this Court. Where there 
is a predominant personal motivation, the first variation of the 
"dual purpose" test set forth in Clover should be applied. Gloria 
Swenson had not been sent to the Frontier Cafe, as compared to 
Zulliger in Clover, who had been sent to the Mid-Gad Restaurant, 
and was on his way back to the Plaza Restaurant at the time of his 
accident. Admittedly, if Ms. Swenson had been sent by Burns off 
the premises on some errand and she, on her return trip, had 
stopped by the Frontier Cafe to pick up soup, and then resumed her 
travel back to her post at Gate 4 prior to the accident, the 
"personal detour" test would apply. However, those are not the 
facts of this case. Because plaintiff's trip was predominantly 
personal, it is clear the "personal detour" approach is inapposite 
and the "second employee" approach suggested in Clover and 
Whitehead should be applied to this case. In its application of 
this approach, the trial court correctly ruled that Swenson's trip 
to the Frontier Cafe "was not motivated in whole or in part by the 
purpose of serving Burns' interests as the employer of Swenson." 
(R. 207). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly viewed the material facts of this 
case in finding that the activities of Ms. Swenson at the time of 
the accident were "so clearly without the scope of her employment 
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with Burns that reasonable minds could not differ as to such 
conclusion." (R. 207.) Under the criteria set forth by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Birkner and Clover, defendant has established that 
Ms. Swenson falls short of qualifying as an employee under any of 
the three criteria. First, Gloria Swenson was not involved in the 
general kind of conduct she was employed to perform. She made a 
personal choice to travel off premises in order to obtain lunch and 
was not involved in any duty inherent in her job as a security 
officer at Gate 4. Second, the accident occurred substantially 
outside the ordinary spatial boundaries of her employment off of 
Geneva property. Attempts by plaintiffs to argue applicability of 
facts relating to jobs other than Gate 4 security guard are 
immaterial and should not be considered in the context of this 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Finally, Gloria Swenson's trip to the 
Frontier Cafe was predominantly, if not wholly, motivated by 
personal interests. Even if this Court were to accept plaintiffs' 
arguments that there was an incidental business motivation to her 
trip, the dual purpose approach established under Clover 
illustrates that this trip was purely personal. Reasonable minds 
cannot differ on application of these facts to the law. 
This defendant adequately established and proved that Gloria 
Swenson could not be considered within the scope of her employment 
at the time of the accident, since she failed to qualify under any 
of the three criteria required by the Utah Supreme Court. Hence, 
the Court was correct in granting Burns' Motion for Summary 
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Judgment. This defendant respectfully submits this Court should 
affirm the trial court's ruling. 
DATED this day of June, 1992. 
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Civil No. CV 89-278 
Deposition of: 
GLORIA SWENSON 
* * * 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 19th day of June, 1991, 
the deposition of GLORIA SWENSON, produced as a witness herein 
at the instance of the defendant, Burns, in the above-entitled 
action now pending in the above-named court, was taken before 
Jennifer A. Russell, a Certified Shorthand Reporter (Certificate 
No. 125), Registered Professional Reporter, and Notary Public 
in and for the State of Utah, commencing at the hour of 9:35 
a.m. of said day at 3325 N. University, Provo, Utah. 
* * * 
Reporter: Jennifer A. Russell 
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A Guard duty, fire fighting, EMT. 
Q Were you located in one particular area? 
A At first I was assigned to Gate 4. 
Q So that's when you first started? 
A When I first started. 
Q And how long did that assignment last? 
A Oh, gosh, I was there quite awhile. 
BOYD SWENSON: Can I say — we was both hired at 
the same time down there at Burns. 
Q Okay. What we will do is we are just taking her depo 
here. And if we feel like it's necessary, maybe we can go off 
the record and see if there is anything you have to add to it 
and we can decide whether we can go on the record. 
MR. HARRIS: The main point is that we are here 
today to see what she remembers, and if there are some things 
you can help with that she can't remember, we will go off the 
record and do it. 
BOYD SWENSON: All right. 
MR. WILLIAMS: And we appreciate that. We will 
kind of follow up afterwards but — 
BOYD SWENSON: When you are talking about how long 
we was assigned to this area or this area, you was all over down 
there a lot. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Okay, we will find out what she 
recalls. 
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1 BOYD SWENSON: Okay. 
2 Q Your main assignment was Gate 4 when you first 
3 started; is that right? 
4 A I did not understand that until I was put there, and 
5 a week later I asked Ben Olsen why I was stationed at Gate 4 
6 only. My interpretation was I would go in and be EMT, fire 
7 fighter. 
8 Q And now who is Ben Olsen? 
9 A He was a lieutenant. 
10 Q What was his response to you while you were? 
11 A He had no idea. He thought I was hired as a gate 
12 floor person only and he did get in touch with Kim Hansey to 
13 find out what was going on. 
14 Q What did you understand Kim Hansey to have told Ben 
15 Olsen about your responsibilities at that time? 
16 A She was going to move me in the plant when I had some 
17 fire training. That's what he come back and told me. 
18 Q So at that time you hadn't received your fire 
19 training; is that right? 
20 A I started the week after I was hired in school. 
21 Q How long did you remain at Gate 4, if you can recall? 
22 A Probably about six months* 
23 Q So at the time of the accident on 7-26-88 you were 
24 still at Gate 4? 
25 A Yes. 
A Who was the lieutenant on duty? 
Q Did you look to him as your supervisor? 
A Nobody ever come bothered us at Gate 4, We didn't 
see the lieutenants and stuff when we were up there. They were 
mostly down with the guys inside. 






I think it was Jim Hoyt, but I'm not sure. 
Jim Hoyt? 
Yes. 
Tell me, if you could, just how your day progressed 
from the time you came on the job up to the time of the 
accident, on the day of the accident. 
A Okay. It was busy, usually is at that station. 
Trucks are coming real heavy. They are backed up clear to the 
highway. About quarter after 11:00 it just — you almost — 
like there is 20 minutes you will get a break. I guess the 
truckers go to lunch is all we can figure. 
Q But it was pretty consistent that you would have a 
break? 
A Well, it would come at different times, but at about 
a quarter after I asked Oly, I says, Are you ready for lunch. 
And he says, No, I don't think I have or want one today. And I 
says, Okay, it looks like there is a break out there. I think I 
will go get me a cup of soup. 
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1 watched the lower gate because the part timer would go home. 
2 Q Now the lower gate is, again, the one further in the 
3 property? 
4 A Farther into the plant, and we would push a button 
5 and let them go through the gate, so we watched from the highway 
6 in. 
7 Q Did you understand your — well, let me ask it this 
8 way. Where did you understand the plant boundaries to be? 
9 A The plant boundaries are from the railroad .track in. 
10 Q Is there a gate or a fence there? 
11 A That crosses it? 
12 Q Yes. 
13 A Yes. The gate crosses this way and this way, the 
14 track. 
15 Q Just to be clear, why don't you draw that, if you 
16 could. And, again, I'm not asking you to be an artist but just 
17 to get an idea. At the top of the page mark north or whichever 
18 direction you consider north. 
19 A This is north here. 
20 Q And just draw the island gate and show where you 
21 understood the boundaries of the Geneva property to be. 
22 A That's — the island down here is Gate 4. And then 
23 it goes on into Geneva from that point on. There is fences that 
24 close over the railroad tracks this way. 
25 Q So why don't you write "railroad tracks" along the 
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place where the railroad tracks actually run. Okay, you have 
marked that with little lines. 
A Yes. 
Q And that runs from north to south; is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q And they are located, as you have drawn them, right 
on the boundaries, on the east boundaries of the Geneva plant? 
A This extends out just a bit to the highway. This is 
the highway, Geneva Road. 
Q Okay. So is it your understanding then that the 
railroad tracks are west of the highway, Geneva Road? 
A Yes. They are on the west side. 
Q And from the railroad tracks west is the Geneva 
property? 
A Yes. 
Q Was it your understanding that your work as a guard 
was to be on the Geneva property? 
MR. HARRIS: Objection. Leading. 
Q Go ahead. You can answer that. We do this for the 
record. 
A Okay. My job consisted of doing my job. We had no 
designated lunch hour at any time. No designated break at any 
time. We took them as we could get them, and that was few and 
far between. There was many days there was never a lunch, if 
that's what you are asking me. 
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Q Where was your post as you understood it when you 
were on Gate 4? 
A There and there• 
Q Okay. You have marked Gate 4. 
A Gate 4 island. 
Q And the island. Okay. So when you were on Gate 4, 
your responsibilities were between the island and Gate 4? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. That is all within the spatial boundaries and 
I'm talking about the entire Geneva area. 
A Yes. That one is inside the boundary. 
Q You indicated that you would take a lunch when you 
could get it; is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q And normally you would take it when there was a break 
in the traffic; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And sometimes you would bring your lunch and eat it 
A Yes. 
Q — at your post; is that right? 
A We always ate it at the post, always. Even if we 
went and got it, we ate it at the post. 
Q When you would go get your lunch across the way, that 
was a choice that you made, whether you would go across or bring 
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your lunch; is that a fair assessment? 
A Yes. 
Q That was up to the guard to determine whether he or 
she would go off the premises and get the lunch or just bring 
their lunch in? 
MR. HARRIS: Objection. Leading. 
Q Do you understand the question? 
A Well, I can tell — what I can tell you, there is 
some days we had lunches, some days we did not. One or the 
other of us went for a cup of soup. That was our lunch. That's 
what you had time for. 
Q Sometimes the guard would bring his or her own lunch 
in; is that right? 
A Yes. A lot of time it was shared because you never 
got a break to have anything. 
Q Did you consider that if you chose to go across and 
get a cup of soup that you were on a personal errand? 
MR. HARRIS: That's leading again. 
A No. I was doing my job. 
Q Were you told to go get a cup of soup? 
A No, I was never told to go get a cup of soup. 
Q Did you consider that part of your — 
A But I know that you are entitled to a lunch hour. 
Q Okay. Let me ask you this. And you made the 
personal choice to go get a cup of soup, right? 
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1 A I went for lunch, yes. 
2 Q And you were not directed to go get a cup of soup by 
3 anyone at Burns? 
4 A No. 
5 MR. HARRIS: Objection. Leading still. 
6 Q That was your personal choice, was it not? 
7 A I guess if you are hungry, that's your choice. 
8 Q Sure. And that wasn't part of your job description 
9 to go get a lunch at the Frontier, was it? 
10 MR. HARRIS: Same objection. Leading. 
11 A I don't know what you are reaching for other than — 
12 Q Just answer the question is all I'm asking. 
13 MR. HARRIS: If you don't understand the question, 
14 don't answer it. Have him reask it. 
15 A Reask it again. 
16 Q Was it your understanding that you had the personal 
17 choice to either bring your lunch in or to go off and get it? 
18 A Yes. 
19 MR. HARRIS: Objection. Leading. 
20 Q Tell me what you did from the time that you left to 
21 the time that you got involved in the accident. Tell me what 
22 happened. Just walk us through that sequentially. 
23 A I made a phone call over to have the cup of soup 
24 ready. That's what I had, one cup of soup. And I walked in 
25 picked it up. 
24 
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Q How did you get there? 
A In my car, 
Q Okay. You drove? 
A I walked out and the traffic was heavy on the highway 
and I come back and got my car and drove over. 
Q And you drove across the highway? 
A Yes. 
Q You pulled in to the restaurant, got out of your car? 
A Yes. 
Q And you got a cup of soup. Is that all? 
A One cup of soup. 
Q You didn't get anything for any other guards? 
A No. 
Q And it wasn't your habit, was it, to go buy lunch for 
other guards? 
MR. HARRIS: Objection. Leading. 
A No. 
Q You got back in your car? 
A Yes. 
Q Tell me what transpired from the time you got back 
into your car. 
A I got back in the — I set the soup between my bucket 
seats. 
Q What kind of car were you driving? 
A It was a Dodge. 
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1 under glass with other stuff. We had it on the wall. We had it 
2 down at the gate. 
3 Q It was even in both locations? 
4 A Yes. It's at all the gates. There is a posting of 
5 all the restaurants around. 
6 Q Is that where you got the phone number is off that 
7 menu so you could call? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q Now prior to the time of this accident, did you have 
10 knowledge one way or another as to whether the lieutenants, the 
11 supervisors, the people above you knew that you and, to your 
12 knowledge, others had gone, were going over to Frontier on 
13 occasion to get their lunch? 
14 MR. WILLIAMS: Objection. 
15 A I'm sure they did. The lieutenants themselves went 
16 there. 
17 Q There has been some testimony from other witnesses 
18 that there were even meetings held at the Frontier Cafe between 
19 the lieutenants and the captain and company officials from Salt 
20 Lake. Were you aware of that? 
21 A Yes, I was. I know a time Burns people have met and 
22 went there. 
23 Q Did you personally ever attend any type of a meeting, 
24 formal or informal, at the Frontier Cafe? 
25 A On duty? While I was on duty? 
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Q Well, let's take it — break it in half. On duty and 
off duty. 
A On duty, no. Off duty, yes. 
Q When off duty, was that a situation where you were 
receiving some kind of instruction or training or information — 
A Never. 
Q — from one of the supervisors and that's why you met 
at the cafe? 
A No. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Objection. Leading. 
Q You state that you did have informal meetings at the 
cafe. I'm confused. 
A One. 
Q Tell me who was there and when was it and what 
happened. 
A It was concerning a case that had happened to another 
employee down there that was taking Burns to court. 
Q Was it with that employee? 
A No. It was with a lieutenant. 
Q It was with the lieutenant. And was it a — I'm 
interested — what was the context of the meeting? Did he call 
and ask you to come to the cafe and have the meeting, chance 
meeting? 
A He had just got off duty and we went there right 



























Program and Burns Regulations, Policies and procedures, I wasn't 
able to find anything that specifically dealt with lunch breaks 
or coffee breaks or — 
A I don't recall anything either. 
Q Do you remember any policy one way or another on 
lunch breaks or — and by policy I mean oral policy, spoken or 
written, on lunch breaks or coffee breaks or potty breaks, 
anything to do with that. 
A When you can get them, you take them. That's all I 
was ever told and that was, like I say, many days if — 
Q Do you know if during the time you were employed at 
Burns as to whether the lieutenants themselves in their own cars 
went to the Frontier Cafe and picked up food or lunches for any 
of the Burns employees? 
A In their own car? 
Q In their company car while they were on duty. 
A Not for us, but maybe for the lieutenants and the 
captain's meeting. 
Q As I understand it, there are occasions when there is 
A I brought food back to my own lieutenant many times. 
Q From Frontier Cafe? 
A Yes. 
Q And he would pick that up and eat it in his car or 
sit there in the island post? 
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A We would usually meet at the fire station. This is, 
like I say, on graveyard when things were slow or something, but 
I did actually bring food back for my lieutenant. 
Q Gate 4 during the day shift has two people, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Then there are times when there is only one person? 
A Swing shift. 
Q And other gates there is only one person at the gates 
when they are open, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you have any information one way or another if the 
lieutenants would have picked up lunches for the single staff 
people, in other words, where they couldn't leave the place 
unmanned and go over and get something to eat? 
A My lieutenant didn't. Usually Car 7 and Car 8 
brought it back to all of us. 
Q Including the other — 
A We would always check with the one on the gate, Would 
you like something. 
Q And that's not just Gate 4; that would be the other 
gates as well? 
A Yes. Sometimes on the graveyard we would always 
check with Gate 4. My lieutenant was a real stickler, you keep 
in touch with everybody, make sure everybody is okay. We always 
would check in on the Gate 4 person up there by themself. Gate 
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2 is clear down the other end of the plant. 
Q And as you saw it, in Car 7 and 8 that was part of 
your responsibilities, to check on these folks and make sure 
they are all right? 
A Yes. 
Q Including if they need something to eat or something 
to drink? There are occasions — 
A I don't understand that as policy, no, but if we were 
going to get us a drink, yes, we would ask them. 
Q And that came from instructions from your lieutenant? 
MR. WILLIAMS: Objection. Leading. 
A To make sure everyone is okay, yes. We had radios. 
Even if it was — there was many times we would be called, Hey, 
go check Gate 4. I can't reach him on the radio. He had no 
relief. If he went to the restroom or something else and we 
couldn't reach him, of course you suspected something is wrong. 
Q There has been some testimony in this record about 
radios and it's still not — at least not clear in my mind. At 
the time of this accident in '88, July of '88, what type of 
radio system did you have there between the — 
A Absolutely none to the island gate. 
Q My question was there is some documents about little 
hand-held walkie-talkies, hip-held walkie-talkies. 
A Yes. 
Q Were those in existence as of July of '88? 
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wearing helmets? 
A Neither of them had helmets on. 
Q How were they clothed, do you recall? 
A Levis and shirts. 
Q Do you know what the speed limit is on Geneva Road? 
A I believe it's 50 miles an hour. 
Q 50? 
A Down at that area. 
Q I believe that in answer to my original questions 
concerning your trip over to the cafe, you were not picking up 
food for anybody at that time; is that right? 
A Not that day, no. 
Q And no one — 
MR. HARRIS: Or anybody else — you mean picking up 
food for herself? 
A I was picking it up for myself. 
Q Sure. I think that's implicit in the question. You 
weren't picking it up for anyone else at that time; is that 
right? 
A Not that day, no. 
Q And you had not been instructed to pick up any food 
for anyone else that day; is that right? 
A No. 
Q And you had not been assigned to go over there that 
day; is that right? 
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1 A Nobody ever assigned you to go. 
2 Q All right. And as I understood youf you had made two 
3 or three trips prior to the date of the accident over to the 
4 cafe in the time that you had been working for Burns. 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q I also understood you to say in answer to my original 
7 question that before that time, before the date of the accident, 
8 you had not gone over to pick up any food for anyone; is that 
9 right? 
10 MR. HARRIS: Let me enter an objection. I don't 
11 think there has been a question on that nor has she testified 
12 that way. That would be a mischaracterization or 
13 misunderstanding by you. 
14 Q All right. Do you remember when I originally asked 
15 you about the trip on the day in question whether or not you had 
16 gone over prior to that time to pick up food for anyone else? 
17 Had you ever done that before the time of the accident? 
18 A Before the — yes, I had. 
19 Q When was the last time you had done that? 
20 MR. HARRIS: Prior to the accident, you mean? 
21 Q Yes. 
22 A A date? 
23 Q Yes. 
24 A I don't know a date. I mean, we worked — the only 
25 time we went over was when we were on the day shift. 
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which one, they indicated that these security guards 
did interchange positions; sometimes they are a rover, 
and sometimes they are at Gate 1, and sometimes they 
are at another gate. Is that true? 
A That is true. 
Q And you want to make it some kind of a 
proviso that the people at Gate 4 routinely stayed at 
Gate 4? 
A Yes. 
Q Are you aware as to whether ever the people 
at Gate 4 also interchanged into the rover even 
occasionally? 
A The people that are assigned to Gate 4, the 
answer to that is no, they don't perform the job as 
rover, No. 1, because they are not EMTs, firefighters, 
they are guards. The job of that rover has to include 
the fact that they are Emergency Medicine Technicians 
and a firefighter. That is the reason that he has the 
car. 
Q Do you know that Gloria Swenson is an EMT and 
a firefighter? 
A Yes, she was. 
Q Do you know if she ever performed the 
function of a rover? 
A Yes, she did. 
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Q Now, are you aware that when someone is doing 
the job of rover, as to whether it was authorized or 
whether it was okay for them to stop and take a coffee 
break or a rest room break at either of those 
restaurants? 
A To my knowledge, that has never been okay 
based on my understanding of the post orders. 
Q Okay. 
A Specifically based on the January 11 Memo to 
Post. 
Q Thank you. And I will try to ask a better 
question. Prior to the January 11, 1990 Post Order, 
were you aware as to whether there was a practice of 
the rovers that they did in fact take their coffee 
break, or rest room break, or pick up a sandwich. I'm 
talking about a small break, I'm not talking about an 
hour break, or lunch hour, that type of thing, and the 
rover, not Gate 4 or Gate 1, the rover took that break 
at either of the restaurants? 
A I am aware that I think at times that that 
had happened. 
Q And that was something that the lieutenants 
were aware of, it was common knowledge? 
A I would say, yes, common knowledge. I can't 
tell you what they were aware of. I don't know what 
43 
Q Now, in your definition of breaks, is that 
also concerning either eating lunch, or dinner, or 
breakfast, if any, I guess depending on what shift you 
are on? 
A A meal. Lunch is expected to be taken on the 
job. 
Q And again, that is not in writing, that is 
just your understanding of what the practice is? 
A That is my understanding of what the practice 
is. 
Q And when is it to be eaten? 
A No specific time. 
Q "When there is a hole in the action"? 
A That would be reasonable. 
Q And that would be involving 10 or 15 minutes 
or longer? 
A I mean depending on what happens. It could 
take an hour and a half to eat a sandwich if the 
traffic didn't allow it quicker than that. 
Q Let me ask you another question. Gate 4, and 
talking with Mr. Mayne and Ms. Hancey, they indicated 
there are busy times and slow times at Gate 4, there 
are shift changes? 
A During day shift there are no nonbusy times 
at Gate 4. 
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1 truck stop, cafe or it's predecessor — I know that's gone 
2 through a lot of construction — was it opened during that 
3 period of time? 
4 A Yesf it was. 
5 Q And did you personally ever have occasion to 
6 frequent that establishment for coffee breaks or lunch 
7 breaks in your eight month — 
8 A In the scope of my duty, yes. 
9 Q And in the scope of your duty would be what? 
10 A At the time that it was a USX operation it was 
11 the responsibility of one of the roving patrolman to pick 
12 up and distribute lunches throughout the — mill throughout 
13 the USX employees that were being held over for overtime 
14 and I on numerous occasions have picked up and distributed 
15 lunches. 
16 Q Okay. And that would be — and that was done 
17 either by you or by whoever was involved in the roving — 
18 A Correct. 
19 Q — assignment? While you were working at gate 
20 4, ever have an occasion while you were on shift still 
21 booked in and not booked out to personally, not for 
22 overtime people or for — as in the roving capacity, ever 
23 go to that cafe or its predecessor for a break, coffee 
24 break or lunch break? 
25 A It's possible. I don't recall specifically. 
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Let's clarify that also. Are you referencing as a USX 
employee or as a Burns employee? 
Q If they are different answers tell me. 
A Okay. As a Burns employee I never — I don't 
recall ever working the north gate as a Burns employee. My 
time and tenure on that gate would have been as a USX 
employee. 
Q And that is the time where it would have been 
possible you could have gone over there, you don't remember 
specific? 
A As a USX employee, yes. There's no 
possibilities. I definitely did go over when I was a USX 
employee. 
Q For coffee breaks or lunch breaks? 
A Picking up lunches and distributing lunches. 
Q All right. And I understand that question and I 
don't need to ask that question again. I'm talking 
specifically when you worked gate 4 as a gate person. 
A I don't recall. 
Q Are you personally aware, other than on this 
instance of this case, as to whether in your experience for 
Burns Security as to whether any of your employees have, 
while being assigned at gate 4, have utilized that 
establishment for a latrine break, coffee break or to pick 
up their own individual meal? 
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1 Q So it was not unreasonable to think that the guard 
2 in the car might go get lunch over at the cafe and bring it to 
3 you? Would that be true? 
4 A Well, if the time came, and once in awhile it may 
5 happen, but — 
6 Q Did it happen once in awhile? 
7 A Well, never to me, but I can't answer the others, 
8 but that would --
9 Q Did you ever see it happen for anybody else at gate 
10 four? That one's tough, isn't it? 
11 A Yeah. 
12 Q That one's tough because it calls for you to 
13 remember a long time back, and also that's a tough one because 
14 that's really the construction of the whole lawsuit, right, 
15 everything here in a nutshell? Do you personally know of 
16 other people going over to the Frontier Cafe to get lunches 
17 for guards at gate four? 
18 MR. WILLIAMS: Are you saying for other guards other 
19 than themselves personally? 
20 Q (By Mr. Patton) I'm saying do you know of any 
21 guards going over there for themselves or going over there for 
22 others to get lunches for guards who are working gate four? 
23 Now, you've indicated it never happened for you, and I'm 
24 assuming that's why you're still working there, okay? Because 
25 obviously they're very happy with you, all right? But I want 
28 
1 to know if you ever personally saw it happen. 
2 A No, because during my time of the shift I had, no, 
3 there was no time that I can recall someone else that I worked 
4 with calling to have anybody go pick them up a lunch. 
5 Q Do you ever remember seeing anyone working your 
6 shift run across the street or drive across the street and get 
7 their own? 
8 A Well, yes. 
9 Q And who was that? 
10 A Well, that's when this accident happened, the day 
11 that Gloria went. 
12 Q Was there anyone besides Gloria who ever went and 
13 did that? Not you, but did you see anyone else ever do that 
14 besides Gloria? 
15 A Well, I know of incidents where some have done it. 
16 Q Do you know the names of some of these people who 
17 have done it? 
18 A Well, therefs only two or three of us that have 
19 worked that gate very long and there's others come and go, and 
20 for three, four years to try and remember their names, I just 
21 don't remember them. 
22 Q Do you know if Gloria saw other people doing it? 
23 A I can't answer that for her. 
24 Q Well, see, I know for a fact that there was that 
25 little communication that came out after the accident that 
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1 Q Do you consider that to be off your post? 
2 A Well/ yeah/ it would have to be off because it's not 
3 on the premises. 
4 Q If anyone went over on their time as a Burns guard, 
5 would you consider that to be on their own time, if they went 
6 over to the cafe to pick up lunch for themselves? 
7 A Well/ yes, I'd have to say that they would be on 
8 their own time. 
9 Q Would you consider that to be their personal errand 
10 for themselves, as opposed — 
11 MR. PATTON: Objection, calls for speculation, calls 
12 for a legal conclusion. That's what the issues are all about. 
13 MR. WILLIAMS: You can go ahead and answer. You've 
14 answered his questions about legal conclusions. 
15 THE WITNESS: Repeat that for me. 
16 Q (By Mr. Williams) Would you consider a guard going 
17 over to pick up lunch to be on their own time, personal 
18 errand, as opposed to company business? 
19 MR. PATTON: Same objection. 
20 THE WITNESS: Well, let me put it this way. It's a 
21 little different than running over to the billing office to go 
22 to the John, but I think that it takes about the same amount 
23 of time. The only difference that I can see is the fact that 
24 the cafe is off the premises. 
25 MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. No further questions. 
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you know of anyone ever being 
sir. 
even though a supervisor might 
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show up at the 
of the guards has gone up to the Frontier Cafe 
and come back, you know of no 
or doing it? 
sir. 
you know of no one ever being 
one ever being 
told not to do 
until after Gloria's accident; isn't that true? 
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MR- PATTON: No further questions 
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: errand at the 
cons. Lder 
just as an estimate, average, 
wasn't a regular practice? 
sir • 
you consider yourself on your 
once a month. 
own personal 
time you'd go and get food, or would you 
yourself on company time? 
MR. PATTON: Objection, calls for a legal 
20 
conclusion. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Go ahead and answer. 
THE WITNESS: I was still on company time. I mean I 
was being paid for it during that time, yes. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) Let me ask you this. Company 
time is during the time of your job. Do you consider it 
something you were doing for the company or something you were 
doing for yourself? 
A Well, something doing for myself, I was getting a 
lunch. 
Q All right. So you consider that a personal errand? 
A That's correct. 
MR. WILLIAMS: No further questions. 
FURTHER EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PATTON: 
Q I am going to read to you from the deposition of 
Michael Transtrum that was taken April 4, 1990 at 9:00 a.m. by 
Mr. Harris, and I believe you were present, counsel. I'm not 
sure but I believe you were. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Probably was. 
Q (By Mr. Patton) Referring to page 81. Question by 
Mr. Harris: "Whether they be relieving themselves or getting 
some nourishment, or just a few minutes of quiet time, it is 
helpful for the employee?" Answer: "It would be helpful." 
To the best of your recollection if the employee is going down 
rinf-7T3rTT»T?T3T r7T?r> mr>7 vrcr»r> r-rm 
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their --" a n d he's meaning security officers — "break would 
be taken in that type of manner so that they can perform their 
job adequately, yes." You would agree with his answer; is 
that true? 
A Correct. 
Q And the next question was, "And the fact that they 
would get* a break would help them perform their job 
adequately?" A n d the answer was, "I would say yes." Would 
you agr<^ with that same answer? 
A Yes# sir. 
Q And the next question was, "It would help everything 
from their disposition to how they treat customers and the 
clients?" A n d the answer was, "Yes, they are people and 
people <'° like breaks." To the best of your knowledge that's 
still tiue? 
A That's correct. 
Q And the next question was, "And there is no question 
that there is some benefit to these breaks to Burns Security, 
the empl°Yer?" An(3 M* • Transtrum's answer was "Yes." 
MP. WILLIAMS: I'll just lodge an objection to the 
extent I hat calls for a legal conclusion. 
0 Would you agree with Mr. Transtrum's conclusion? 
A Yes. 
MR. PATTON: No further questions. 
0 (By Mr. Williams) Following up on my questioh I 
24 
asked you before, if you go over to the cafe and get some food 
to eat, do you consider yourself on your own time? Excuse me, 
let me strike the use of the own time. Do you consider 
yourself on a personal errand? 
A Yes, sir. 
MR. WILLIAMS: No further questions. 
Q (By Mr. Patton) But the reason you went to the 
Frontier Cafe and not to, say, McDonald1s on Center Street in 
Orem is because you still wanted to be very close to the 
proximity of gate four and be gone the shortest possible time 
so you could be back at the gate as soon as possible; isn't 
that true? 
A Well, logistically I would say yes. 
MR. PATTON: Thank you. No further questions. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) The cafe is not within the 
boundaries of the Geneva Steel plant; is that correct? 
A No, sir. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. Patton) Mr. Olsen remembers an occasion 
when there was a truck/train accident or something that was 
off the Geneva premises. Do you remember that accident? 
A No, sir. 
Q Do you remember any accidents taking place on the 
roadway in front of Geneva or off the premises? 
A No, sir. I wasn't on duty at the time. 
